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Richard Epstein is one of the most influential legal thinkers of
our time. Not long ago, a survey of the "most-cited legal scholars"
ranked him number twelve, just behind Archibald Cox, Guido
Calabresi, and Harry Kalven, Jr., and ahead of Lawrence Friedman,
Henry Hart, and Cass Sunstein.1 A recent retrospective of his work
described him as a "world-class legal scholar and teacher."2 Thus, it is
not surprising that Epstein has produced a casebook on torts-now in
its seventh edition-that lives up to this reputation. Cases and Mate-
rials on Torts' is a complex, challenging, and provocative casebook
precisely because Epstein is a complex, challenging, and provocative
scholar.
A fascinating aspect of Epstein's scholarly work is his exploration
of the apparent tension between libertarian principles and utilitarian
thought4 -an exploration that comes alive in his casebook. To Ep-
stein, these two competing principles often coalesce to yield a single"correct" answer to a problem. In other words, the answer that arises
from a desire to protect a pre-determined set of individual rights-for
example, private property rights, or the right of personal autonomy-
often produces an outcome that is also beneficial to the overall com-
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1. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409, 424 (2000); see
also Leonard J. Long, Introduction to Conference on Law and Philosophy: The Works of Richard A.
Epstein, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 655, 655-56 (2000) (summarizing Epstein's contributions to
legal scholarship).
2. Long, supra note 1, at 656.
3. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (7th ed. 2000) [hereinafter
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS].
4. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD (1998) [hereinafter FREE SOCIETY].
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mon good.' Some scholars have critiqued Epstein's work by suggest-
ing that there is more disharmony than harmony in the relationship
between the libertarian and utilitarian approaches. 6 Who has the bet-
ter argument on the point, however, is not relevant for present pur-
poses. What is relevant is that Epstein introduces, confronts, and ex-
plores the potential for tension between the two approaches
throughout his casebook in a way that provokes thoughtful and inter-
esting classroom discussion.
A second, and closely related, theme that Epstein explores in his
casebook is the overwhelming importance of the older, historic com-
mon law cases to the study of torts. In fact, the book devotes almost
seventy pages to the age-old debate over whether negligence or strict
liability should govern unintentional harms. This historical approach
reinforces Epstein's emphasis on the libertarian/utilitarian divide; in-
deed, the strict liability versus negligence debate roughly parallels the
libertarian/utilitarian tension, with strict liability generally (although
not necessarily) associated with the former and negligence generally
(although not necessarily) associated with the latter.7 This historical
grounding also gives students a basis for understanding why negli-
gence governs some unintentional harms while strict liability governs
others, and provides them with the tools to challenge the current
boundaries between the two theories. Finally, a more historical ap-
proach to tort law gives students some sense of the expansion and con-
traction of tort liability over time-an understanding that puts "tort
reform" in context.
A casebook author faces a difficult task: presenting the material
in its fullest complexity, while at the same time developing some basic,
and hopefully interesting and thought-provoking, themes that tie the
material together. Cases and Materials on Torts finds this delicate bal-
ance through the twin themes of the libertarian/utilitarian tension and
the importance of the historic common law. Thus, the casebook is
ideal for classroom teachers who find these themes interesting and im-
portant lenses through which to view the subject of torts.
5. See id. at 9-39.
6. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Maimon Schwarzschild, The Uncertain Relationship Between
Libertarianism and Utilitarianism, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 657 (2000) (noting doubts about Ep-
stein's goal of reconciling libertarian and utilitarian approaches); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 346 (1990) (describing Epstein's "marriage of utilitarianism and
libertarianism" as "an uneasy one"); Jerry L. Mashaw, Against First Principles, 31 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 211, 214 (1994) (describing the "[Ilibertarian -utilitarian difficulties" in Epstein's work).
7. See CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 144-48.
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I. THE LIBERTARIANISM V. UTILITARIANISM TENSION
Throughout his scholarly work, Epstein challenges the age-old
assumption that libertarian and utilitarian principles must, by defini-
tion, clash.8 He admits that the relationship between the two is often"vexed" and "[u]neasy," 9 and rightly so, for the relationship is a diffi-
cult one.
Libertarianism starts with a pre-defined set of individual rights,
and then seeks to vindicate those rights when confronted with a legal
problem. The "correct" answer to the problem is determined by iden-
tifying which party invaded the other party's rights. An overly sim-
plified example of this approach is the following: One has a right to
drive down the highway without being hit by another car. If Car A is
driving down the highway, and Car B rear-ends it, then Car B is the
wrongdoer because it invaded Car A's rights.
The outcome in a libertarian approach is determined by how,
and by whom, the rights are defined.'" Epstein defines his set of rights
as the "libertarian quartet."" Under Epstein's account, the law must
first "prevent collision between people" by recognizing the right of
personal autonomy. 2 The law then must "find some way to assign
rights in external things to individuals," i.e., to define and recognize
property rights. 3 Next, the law must, through the vehicle of tort law,
protect the rights of personal autonomy and property from invasion,
and finally, it must "facilitate gains from trade by allowing the transfer
and redefinition of rights" through contract law.' 4 In his early work in
tort law, Epstein grappled with the question of how to identify the"rights invader" and "rights invadee" through an analysis of causa-
tion. "
8. For an explanation of the libertarian/utilitarian divide, see Lea Brilmayer, Lonely
Libertarian: One Man's View of Antidiscrimination Law, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105, 109 (1994).
9. Richard A. Epstein, The Uneasy Marriage of Utilitarian and Libertarian Thought, 19
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 783 (2000) [hereinafter Uneasy Marriage]; FREE SOCIETY, supra note 4, at
9-15 (discussing the tension).
10. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 297, 299, 301 (1986). For his part,
Dworkin has put forward his own theory of tort law, which stresses an "abstractly egalitarian
theory of distributive justice." Stephen R. Perry, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Negligence Stan-
dard, 54 VAND. L. REV. 893, 895 (2001). While Epstein does not formally introduce the con-
cept of distributive justice, he does trace the rise of compensation theories in tort law. See, e.g.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at xxxiii.
11. Uneasy Marriage, supra note 9, at 786-87.
12. Id. at 786.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151
(1973).
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By contrast, utilitarianism confronts a legal problem not by seek-
ing to identify the "invader" and "invadee," but rather by asking,
what result would best further social utility?16 Thus, utilitarianism is a
consequentialist approach-that is, in confronting a legal problem, it
looks at the consequences of legal rules. Again, the key is to define
what social objective consequentialists seek to maximize-for exam-
ple, utility, happiness, or wealth.17
Utilitarians and other consequentialists"t do not approach a prob-
lem with a pre-defined set of rights to be vindicated, but rather put all
the parties' behavior on the table for examination. As stated by
Ronald Coase:
The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts
harm on B and what has to be decided is: how should we restrain
A? But this is wrong. We are dealing with a problem of a recip-
rocal nature. To avoid the harm to B would inflict harm on A.
The real question that has to be decided is: should A be allowed
to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A?' 9
Coase illustrates his fundamental insight of "reciprocal causa-
tion" with the case of the confectioner who produces noise and vibra-
tions that disturb his neighbor, a doctor. The question is not who has
the predetermined "right" to go about his work, but rather, which ac-
tivity does society want to favor? According to Coase, "[t]he problem
posed by this case was essentially whether it was worth while, as a re-
sult of restricting the methods of production which [sic] could be used
by the confectioner, to secure more doctoring at the cost of a reduced
supply of confectionary products."2 All things considered, utilitari-
ans define the "correct" answer as the one maximizes social utility.2'
16. See FREE SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 13.
17. Id. However, Epstein has noted that "[t]he choice of happiness, utility, or wealth raises
important controversies within the consequentialist school, but these divisions pale in compari-
son to the starker opposition with" rights-based theories such as libertarianism. Id.
18. Unfortunately, the term "utilitarianism," which refers to maximizing social utility, is
often mistakenly used to mean "consequentialism"; properly used, the former is a subset of the
latter. See id.; see also Uneasy Marriage, supra note 9, at 784. On the other hand, utilitarianism is
often confused with the law and economics movement, which seeks to maximize wealth, not so-
cial utility. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 391. The confusion between wealth maximization and
utility maximization led Richard Posner to avowedly disclaim any association with utilitarianism.
Id. ("Wealth maximization is an ethic of productivity and social cooperation-to have a claim on
society's goods and services[,] you must be able to offer something that other people value
while utilitarianism is a hedonistic, unsocial ethic ....").
19. Ronald Coase, The Problem with Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960).
20. Id. Coase leaves the task of answering this and similar questions to others. See, e.g.,
Pierre Schlag, An Appreciative Comment on Coase's The Problem of Social Cost: A View From the
Left, 1986 WiS. L. REv. 919, 935 (1986) (noting that "Coase did not dispense legal prescrip-
tions"); George L. Priest, Gossiping About Ideas, 93 YALE L.J. 1625, 1635 (1984) ("Coase's mes-
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The conflict between libertarianism and utilitarianism is plain.
In their purest forms, the former ignores consequences, and the latter
suggests that only consequences matter. Additionally, libertarianism
stresses the rights of individuals; utilitarianism stresses the collective
good. 22 Although Epstein recognizes this potential for conflict, he
suggests that, in practice, often the two approaches converge. In other
words, the two approaches come up with the same "correct" answer-
that is, the outcome that is protective of rights also happens to yield
the best social outcomes.2 1 Our society protects certain rights from in-
vasion not simply because we favor rights in the abstract, but also be-
cause over the long term we have found that those rights serve the
overall common good.
Although Epstein's critics commend him for his "touchin[g] op-
timism," they express doubts that the two approaches are reconcil-
able. 24 For his part, Epstein has remained committed to his mission to
demonstrate, on a case-by-case basis, that the "forces that link indi-
vidual liberty to the common good are far stronger than those that
seemingly drive them apart. "21
It is thus not surprising that Epstein has chosen to explore the
potential for tension (and possible reconciliation) between these two
sage is ultimately nihilistic. After presenting repeated examples in which attempts to correct
market failures only further reduce social welfare, Coase concludes that 'economics provides no
guide whatever to social policy."'). But see POSNER, supra note 6, at 369 n.14 (while Coase is
skeptical whether economics has much to contribute to human knowledge outside the domain of
explicit markets, he "thinks lawyers ... will borrow the parts of economic theory that are use-
ful .... ").
21. See, e.g., Steven Hetcher, Non-Utilitarian Negligence Norms and the Reasonable Person
Standard, 54 VAND. L. REV. 863, 867 (2001) ("The utilitarian thinks tort law should be used as
an instrument to promote social welfare because social welfare alone is what is ultimately worth
promoting").
22. See FREE SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 11; POSNER, supra note 6, at 346. As George
Fletcher has described the conflict: "The courts face the choice. Should they surrender the indi-
vidual to the demands of maximizing utility? Or should they continue to protect individual in-
terests in the face of community needs?" George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory,
85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 573 (1972).
23. According to Epstein, his basic thesis is that:
[N]atural law thinking developed an acute and sound appreciation of the basic rights
that any utilitarian would, on reflection, want to adopt in his society.... The first
step in the reconciliation of the two traditions is to focus on some of their major bat-
tlegrounds and show how utilitarian principle, broadly conceived, supports-even
dictates-many of the categorical conclusions that natural law thinkers took for
granted.
FREE SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 15. See also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 5 (1985) [hereinafter TAKINGS] ("liber-
tarian and utilitarian justifications of individual rights[,]... properly understood[,] ... tend to
converge in most important cases").
24. See Alexander & Schwarzschild, supra note 6, at 657, 662; see also supra note 6.
25. FREE SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 9.
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approaches in his casebook. The casebook begins with one of the most
celebrated and criticized cases in tort history: Vosburg v. Putney.26 In
Vosburg, fourteen-year-old Andrew Vosburg and eleven-year-old
George Putney were pupils in a school in Waukesha, Wisconsin.27
One day, George decided to get Andrew's attention by kicking him
under the desk on his shin. Soon after the incident, Andrew became
seriously ill and underwent two operations.28 Eventually, he lost all
use of the limb.
Vosburg raises a number of challenging questions to explore on
the first day of first-year torts. Should George be held accountable for
the unexpected damage that resulted from a seemingly innocuous kick
in the shin?29 To state a cause of action for an intentional tort, does
the tortfeasor need to intend to inflict the damage, or is the intention
to do the "wrongful act" sufficient to establish liability? Was the kick"wrongful" because it happened after school "had been called to order
by the teacher"?3" Did the doctor who gave Andrew "anodynes to
quiet the pain" 31 commit malpractice that exacerbated his injuries?
What about the fact that Andrew had suffered an injury "just above
the knee" in a coasting accident a month-and-a-half before the inci-
dent in the schoolhouse?32 Does it make a difference that Andrew and
George were classmates-accustomed to getting one another's atten-
tion by kicking-rather than strangers on the street?
The case also presents a wonderful window into the libertar-
ian/utilitarian debate. In deciding who should win, the libertarian
would take Andrew's right of personal autonomy, that is, his right of"self-ownership," as a given.33 According to Epstein, tort law protects
the right of personal autonomy from invasion "by prohibiting the use
of force or deception to compromise that autonomy."34  Therefore,
since Andrew's right of personal autonomy was invaded by George
through a kick to the shin, George should be liable.
The utilitarian would approach the case much differently. An-
drew has no predefined right to be free from kicks, nor does George
have a predefined right to kick. The question is: Which activity do we
26. 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891) (appearing in CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra
note 3, at 4). For a discussion of the case and its role in American tort doctrine, see Zigurds L.
Zile, Vosburg v. Putney: A Centennial Story, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 877 (1992).
27. CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 4.
28. Id. at 5.
29. See id. at 524 (formally introducing the concept of the eggshell plaintiff rule).
30. Id. at 6.
31. Id. at 4.
32. Id. at 5.
33. FREE SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 24.
34. Uneasy Marriage, supra note 9, at 786.
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as a society want to encourage or discourage? Moreover, what sorts of
incentives do we want to create for future Georges and Andrews? If
Andrew prevails, all future Georges will have to take extra care to sit
up straight in their seats and refrain from seemingly innocent play; the
classroom and the playground will become a hotbed of litigation activ-
ity. Alternatively, if George prevails, all future Andrews will have to
take extra care in segregating themselves from others in their classes.
Perhaps they will have to stay home from school, or be required to
wear a "shin guard."3
In Epstein's world, the two approaches might converge in a sin-
gle answer: Andrew could prevail because he is entitled to be free from
kicks or because it maximizes social utility to require George to keep
his kicks to himself. On the other hand, the approaches might diverge
if making Andrew wear a shin guard would maximize overall social
utility.36 Certainly, first-year torts students will not be able to come
up with a definitive answer on the questions posed. Indeed, scholars
have not. The point is that through penetrating and provocative ex-
planatory notes, this casebook requires students to ask these questions.
The libertarian/utilitarian debate appears more consciously and
directly in LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Rail-
way."7 LeRoy Fibre stored about 700 tons of straw on its land in
stacks that stood less than 100 feet from the adjoining property, a right
of way owned by the defendant railroad. A jury found that sparks
from a negligently operated train caused a fire that eventually de-
stroyed LeRoy Fibre's stacks of flax. The question on appeal was
whether LeRoy Fibre could be held contributorily negligent for stor-
ing its stacks of flax too close to the adjoining property.
The right at issue in LeRoy Fibre is the right of private property.
As Blackstone put it, private property is "that sole and despotic do-
minion which [sic] one man claims and exercises over the external
things of the world[] in total exclusion of the right of any other indi-
vidual in the universe."38 Under the libertarian approach, LeRoy Fi-
bre should be able to use its land as it sees fit-that is, to stack its flax
close to the railroad's property, free from the interference of others.
The railroad invaded LeRoy Fibre's property rights, not the other way
around. The court majority took the position that the idea that "one's
uses of his property may be subject to the servitude of the wrongful
35. CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 7.
36. The casebook formally introduces the concept of the cheapest cost avoider much later.
See id. at 146-48.
37. 232 U.S. 340 (1914) (appearing in CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at
322).
38. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 2 (1765), quoted in TAKINGS, supra note 23, at 22.
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use by another ... seems an anomaly.... [T]he rights of one man in
the use of his property cannot be limited by the wrongs of another."39
Enter Justice Holmes, the utilitarian," in an opinion styled a"partial concurr[ence]": "I should say that although ... [LeRoy Fibre]
had a right to put [its] flax where [it] liked upon [its] own land, the li-
ability of the railroad for a fire was absolutely conditioned upon the
stacks being at a reasonably safe distance from the train .... "41 In
other words, LeRoy Fibre did not have a right to put its flax anywhere
it desired on its property. Instead, the question, according to Holmes,
was "whether the plaintiffs flax was so near to the track as to be in
danger from even a prudently managed engine."42
Again, there may be a single right answer: many social benefits
accrue from a regime that would permit a landowner to use his land in
any way he sees fit as long as he does not interfere with the rights of
others.43 Alternatively, the answers may conflict: the landowner may
have to designate part of his land as a "spark zone" and pile only rocks
there." The question is whether the scale is weighted to protect a pre-
defined set of entitlements, or whether all activity is placed on the ta-
ble for scrutiny.
This libertarian/utilitarian tension runs throughout the case-
book. For example, does Bessie Stone have a right to "wal[k] through
the gate in front of her house" without being struck by a cricket ball
hit out of the nearby cricket grounds, or should she simply stay in-
doors on game days?4" Does an accident victim's right of personal
autonomy include the right not to wear a seatbelt, or may his recovery
be reduced for his failure to buckle up?46 Do the Hammontrees need
39. CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 322-23.
40. For a recent examination of Justice Holmes' utilitarianism, see ALBERT W.
ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE
HOLMES (2000).
41. CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 323 (quoting Holmes, J., partially
concurring).
42. Id. For a law and economics analysis of LeRoy Fibre, see RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 36-39, 164 (5th ed. 1998) (using a hypothetical loosely based on
the facts of LeRoy Fibre). See also Mark F. Grady, Common Law Control of Strategic Behavior:
Railroad Sparks and The Farmer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 15 (1988) (criticizing the result in LeRoy
Fibre).
43. See FREE SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 25-31.
44. If this regime is chosen, further questions arise. For example, how large should the
spark zone be? The jury below thought one hundred feet. See CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS, supra note 3, at 322.
45. See id. at 138-48 (presenting Stone v. Bolton, I K.B. 201 (C.A. 1950) and Bolton v.
Stone, 1951 A.C. 850 (appeal taken from C.A.)).
46. See CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 325-31 (discussing the seat-
belt defense).
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to build barricades to protect their bicycle store from cars that veer off
the road, or should Mr. Jenner cease driving?47
The tension between the two approaches is, of course, somewhat
overstated by the above analysis. The future "losers" will not neces-
sarily take the precaution-they might simply take the risk and pay
the judgment if the risk occurs. However, the overstatement serves a
useful purpose, namely, to illustrate for students in plain terms that
one's foundational approach to tort law can lead judges, juries, and
commentators to different answers to the same legal problems. In
other words, Epstein designs the casebook to replicate an oral argu-
ment in which the libertarian argues from one podium and the utilitar-
ian from the other. The students are left free to decide who has the
better argument-or to decide that they both are right for different
reasons.
The libertarian/utilitarian tension is simply not explored to the
same degree in other casebooks. For example, the latest edition of
Franklin and Rabin's Tort Law and Alternatives: Cases and Materials
cites Vosburg only as a note case, and then only with regard to the in-
tention element and the eggshell plaintiff rule.48 Vosburg is a principal
case in Henderson, Pearson and Siliciano's The Torts Process, but the
casebook does not raise the libertarian/utilitarian tension in the
notes.4" Neither of these books cites LeRoy Fibre. Additionally, The
Torts Process does not cite Hammontree, Stone, or the seatbelt cases,
and while Tort Law and Alternatives cites all three, it does not raise the
libertarian/utilitarian tension in the notes."o
Of course, Tort Law and Alternatives and The Torts Process de-
velop other themes in the place of the libertarian/utilitarian divide.
For example, both books examine the torts litigation process in much
more depth.51 Although Cases and Materials on Torts does include a
section on "Judge and Jury," which examines the roles to be played by
47. See id. at 148 (presenting Hammontree v. Jenner, 97 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1971)).
48. MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES
AND MATERIALS 868 (7th ed. 2001). Franklin & Rabin's treatment of Vosburg appears to reflect
the authors' overall view of the diminishing importance of intentional torts. See id.
49. See JAMES A. HENDERSON ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 14-17 (5th ed. 1999).
50. See FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 48, at 3 (using Hammontree as the introductory
case in the casebook), 46 (citing Stone for the standard of care formulation in negligence), 410
(citing Stone in the context of another case), and 458-59 (briefly mentioning the seatbelt cases). I
have chosen to compare Epstein's casebook to Tort Law and Alternatives and The Torts Process
because they are used by my colleagues Pierre Schlag and Emily Calhoun, respectively.
51. For example, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES devotes a fair amount of time in the
first chapter to introducing students to the litigation process. See FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra
note 48, at 9. THE TORTS PROCESS stresses the litigation process throughout the casebook. See
HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 49.
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both institutions, 2 for the most part Epstein leaves it to the classroom
teacher to fill in the procedural gaps for students. In addition, while
both Cases and Materials on Torts and The Torts Process start with in-
tentional torts and Vosburg, Tort Law and Alternatives introduces stu-
dents to the complexities of tort law through Hammontree v. Jenner, a
case in which the plaintiffs argue that strict liability should govern car
accidents.5 3 Thus, Tort Law and Alternatives exposes students from
day one to the concept of competing liability regimes, a theme that
runs throughout the book. 4
In the end, Cases and Materials on Torts-like other torts case-
books-seeks to explore the twists and turns of the law. It is the per-
fect option for those who are interested in exploring these twists and
turns through the libertarian/utilitarian tension.
II. HISTORY MATTERS
Another distinctive feature of Cases and Materials on Torts is its
historical approach to the study of torts. Most torts casebooks, of
course, attempt to familiarize students with the common law method.
After all, torts is fundamentally a common law subject. What sets
Cases and Materials on Torts apart is the fact that it retains the older,
historic common law cases that have been jettisoned by other case-
books.
Epstein inherited this approach when he joined and later took
over the casebook from Harry Kalven and Charles Gregory."5 He
likely would have embraced the approach, however, even if he had
started from scratch. Indeed, the approach nicely reinforces his focus
on the libertarian/utilitarian divide.
For example, Epstein provides students with an in-depth exami-
nation of the age-old debate over whether negligence or strict liability
should govern cases of unintentional injury. In the nearly seventy
pages devoted to the subject, Cases and Materials on Torts introduces
students to cases spanning five centuries, from The Thorns Case,56
Weaver v. Ward,5 7 Scott v. Shepherd,8 Brown v. Kendall,9 the Rylands
52. CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 265-80.
53. FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 49, at 3.
54. I thank my colleague Pierre Schlag for this insight.
55. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CHARLES 0. GREGORY, & HARRY KALVEN, JR., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, xxv (4th ed. 1983) (reprinting the preface to the 3d edition).
56. Y.B. 6 Edw. 4, fol. 7, Mich., pl. 18 (1466) (cited in CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS, supra note 3, at 86).
57. 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616) (cited in CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra note
3, at 92).
58. 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (K.B. 1773) (cited in CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra note
3, at 98).
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cases,6" Brown v. Collins,6 and Powell v. Fall,62 to the more modern
fare of Hammontree v. Jenner"3 and the Stone v. Bolton64 opinions. The
strict liability versus negligence debate roughly parallels the debate be-
tween the libertarian and utilitarian approaches discussed above, with
strict liability generally (although not necessarily) associated with the
former and negligence generally (although not necessarily) associated
with the latter. 65  The historical materials also reinforce Epstein's
scholarly proposition that libertarian and utilitarian approaches may
converge. For example, one advantage of a strict liability regime is
that it is based on a relatively straightforward "you hit, you pay" rule
and avoids the case-by-case nature of the negligence determination.
Thus, the administrative simplicity of strict liability has its utilitarian
benefits.66
The historical approach has many additional benefits as well.
First, extensive treatment of the negligence versus strict liability de-
bate provides students with a critical understanding of the advantages
and disadvantages of each regime. Should defendants be required to
internalize all the costs of their conduct or should they bear only those
costs associated with their failure to abide by an external standard of
care?67 Does the administrative simplicity of strict liability's "you hit,
you pay" regime outweigh the benefits gained by fewer lawsuits over-
all under a negligence regime?68 Epstein challenges students to con-
sider these questions throughout the explanatory notes. By contrast,
given that there is no question that negligence won the battle,69 many
59. 60 Mass. 292 (1850) (cited in CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at
106).
60. See Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866); Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 E. & I.
App. 330 (H.L. 1868) (cited in CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 111, 114,
116).
61. 53 N.H. 442 (1873) (cited in CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 123).
62. 5 Q.B.D. 597 (1880) (cited in CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at
127).
63. 97 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1971) (cited in CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at
148).
64. 1 K.B. 201 (C.A. 1950) (cited in CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at
138).
65. See CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 144-48.
66. See Alexander & Schwarzschild, supra note 6, at 658 (suggesting that "[i]f Epstein is a
utilitarian .... [hie is a rule utilitarian," which the authors define as a philosophy in which "so-
cial utility is to be maximized through rules, principally the common-law and constitutional rules
that Epstein once championed on libertarian grounds.").
67. See CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 151-52.
68. Id. at 152.
69. See CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 153 (suggesting that "negli-
gence principles occupy an important-many would say dominant-role in the law governing
unintentional harms").
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casebooks tend to cut right to the negligence victory, and present strict
liability almost as an afterthought."
In his scholarly work, Epstein has put forth the case for strict li-
ability.71 Nevertheless, he admits the choice between the two regimes
is "difficult"-hence the decades of debate.72 The casebook's histori-
cal look at those debates gives students a starting point for under-
standing how and why particular subjects are covered by negligence
today, while others are governed by strict liability. Without knowl-
edge of this background, the choice appears arbitrary.73 The approach
also encourages students to challenge the current boundary lines be-
tween negligence and strict liability and to imagine a different universe
in which strict liability won out. For example, what would the world
look like if slip-and-fall cases were governed by strict liability?
Second, the casebook's historical approach is important because
it gives students some perspective on the expansion and contraction of
tort liability over time. Notably, tort law as a discrete area of legal
study "came strikingly late in American legal history"-the late 19th
century. 4 Thus, the casebook's historical approach gives students a
sense of tort law's relatively modest beginnings.
For example, the product liability section starts with an 1842
case, Winterbottom v. Wright.7" In Winterbottom, the defendant con-
tracted with the postmaster to supply and maintain coaches for mail
delivery. Meanwhile, one Atkinson contracted with the postmaster to
supply horses and drivers for the coaches. The plaintiff, an employee
of Atkinson, was injured when the coach he was driving broke down
due to a latent defect. The court held that the plaintiff could not sue
the defendant because there was no privity of contract between them.
"Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the par-
ties who entered into them," the court wrote, "the most absurd and
outrageous consequences, .. . would ensue.""
70. See, e.g., HENDERSON, ET AL., supra note 49, at 163-70 (describing the historic com-
mon law).
71. See Epstein, supra note 15.
72. CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 151.
73. The strict liability/negligence materials also track the libertarian/utilitarian debate dis-
cussed above. One advantage of a strict liability regime is that it is based on a relatively straight-
forward "you hit, you pay" rule and avoids the case-by-case nature of the negligence determina-
tion. Thus, the administrative simplicity of strict liability has its utilitarian benefits.
74. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 3
(1980).
75. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842) (presented in CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra
note 3, at 719).
76. Id. at 720.
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The casebook then traces the demise of the privity requirement
through the common law process: from "rule" (as stated in Winterbot-
tom), to "rule limited by exceptions" (as explored in Huset v. J.1. Case
Threshing Machine Co."), to "exceptions swallow rule" (MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co.7). By the time students read Justice Traynor's con-
currence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,79 which em-
braces the strict liability nature of product warranty while rejecting its
privity limitations, they have some sense of how far the law has come.
Indeed, as Justice Traynor concludes, "public policy demands that re-
sponsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the haz-
ards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the
market," including to all members of the distribution chain."
This historical approach is helpful in putting the current debate
over tort reform in perspective. "Tort reform," as scholars often use
that term in contemporary debate, denotes a contraction of tort liabil-
ity."' It is difficult to evaluate such a contraction if one's frame of ref-
erence starts with the modern state of the law. Relatedly, the current
debate over tort reform appears to presume that there is a point to go
back to on the tort expansion continuum. Without a historical per-
spective, it is difficult to decide where that point might be or whether
the current point is a preferable one.
The historical approach also gives meaning in the torts context to
the adage "the more things change, the more they stay the same." In-
deed, the same debates over the limits of tort liability that occurred
years ago continue apace today. For example, the drafters of the Re-
statement of Torts (Third) of Products Liability opted to preserve the
position of the Escola concurrence,82  which subjects non-
manufacturing sellers of products, e.g., retailers and distributors, to
liability "even when [they] do not themselves render the products de-
fective and regardless of whether they are in a position to prevent de-
77. 120 F. 865 (8th Cir. 1903) (presented in CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra
note 3, at 721).
78. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916) (presented in CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra
note 3, at 722).
79. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (presented in CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 729).
80. Id. at 730-31.
81. See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1521, 1587-90 (1987) (observing that, in common parlance, "tort reform" is seen as a contraction
of liability). See also George L. Priest, The Inevitability of Tort Reform, 26 VAL. U.L. REV. 701
(1992).
82. The California Supreme Court, with Justice Traynor writing for the court, adopted the
position of the concurrence in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171-72 (Cal. 1964)
(presented in CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 765-66).
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fects from occurring."83 But several jurisdictions have modified this
rule as part of legislative tort reform measures, insulating non-
manufacturing sellers from liability under certain circumstances.84
Thus, an important window into the current debate over tort reform
measures is the historical "fork in the road" where the common law
first embraced the form of liability.
The historical approach is not without potential pitfalls for the
classroom teacher. The challenge is to present the history without sac-
rificing the present-day debates. While Epstein presents the history
in an interesting and often entertaining way, he could do more to tie
the past with the present more explicitly in the explanatory notes.
Certainly, the history is interesting for its own sake, but the impact of
the history is maximized for students when it is compared to the pre-
sent. Cases and Materials on Torts leaves much of this comparison-
drawing task to the classroom teacher.
A related point is that the historical material takes time to teach.
While Epstein has successfully updated the materials in the seventh
edition to include some of the most significant modern torts contro-
versies, for example, the breast implant, lead paint, and tobacco litiga-
tions, it takes awhile to get there. Indeed, it is possible to get
through the first semester of torts without reaching any of these mod-
ern controversies. Certainly, it is difficult to reach the chapters with a
more "modern" tone-for example, those on damages, insurance,
86
and alternatives to the tort system87-in just one semester.
Finally, there are challenges from the students' perspective. The
older common law cases are harder for students to read and under-
stand, even with Epstein's helpful explanatory notes. Also, the his-
torical approach to the subject matter runs the risk of having a student
in some future litigation base his motion to dismiss plaintiffs product
liability claim on lack of privity, citing Winterbottom v. Wright. In
other words, the professor has to reiterate what the text of the case-
book already makes clear, namely, that some cases are cited for their
83. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (THIRD) OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY §1 cmt. e, § 2 cmt. o
(1998).
84. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (THIRD) OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY §1 cmt. e and an-
notations.
85. See, e.g., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 822-27 (covering the
breast implant litigation), 1248-49 (covering the tobacco litigation), 471-79 (covering the lead
paint litigation).
86. In particular, Epstein could explore current debates more expressly in the insurance
chapter. See id. at 927-59. The seventh edition introduces students to the basic mechanics of
insurance, but does very little to tie insurance to tort liability in a more general or theoretical
sense.
87. See id. at 851-926 (damages), 927-59 (insurance), 961-1026 (no-fault systems).
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historical import, rather than as an accurate reflection of contemporary
law.88 Of course, the more general question-and it is a utilitarian
one-is whether the benefits of the historical approach outweigh the
costs. I believe they do.89
III. CONCLUSION
Torts, like all legal subjects, is complex and often contradictory.
Cases and Materials on Torts takes those complexities and explores
them through the twin themes of the "libertarian/utilitarian tension"
and "history matters." For classroom teachers who find these themes
interesting, valuable, and thought-provoking, Cases and Materials on
Torts is an ideal choice.
88. See, e.g., id. at 85 (chapter entitled "Strict Liability and Negligence: Historic and Ana-
lytical Foundations").
89. A final mode of comparison among the torts casebooks is "heft." See Richard B.
Collins, Cases Versus Theory, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 853, 857 (1998) (reviewing WILLIAM
COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1Othed.
1977)). Epstein's Cases and Materials on Torts is about average on this score, weighing in at 3.75
pounds. Compare FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 48 (weighing in at 4.75 pounds) and
HENDERSON, ET AL., supra note 49 (weighing in at 2.75 pounds).
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